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Abstract
In this paper, we describe a robust quantum cryptography scheme with a heralded single photon
source based on the decoy-state method, which has been shown by numerical simulations to be
advantageous compared with many other practical schemes not only with respect to the secure
key generation rate but also to secure transmission distance. We have experimentally tested this
scheme, and the results support the conclusions from numerical simulations well. Although there
still exist many deficiencies in our present systems, it’s still sufficient to demonstrate the advantages
of the scheme. Besides, even when cost and technological feasibility are taken into account, our
scheme is still quite promising in the implementation of tomorrow’s quantum cryptography.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Cryptography plays an important role in the field of communication, the goal of it is
to render messages between legitimate users (usually called Alice and Bob) but incompre-
hensible to Eve (a malicious eavesdropper). However, classical cryptography is based on
conjectured computational complexity, and its security is thus threatened by the advance-
ment in mathematical algorithms and computational power. Compared with the classical
method, quantum cryptography has unprecedented advantages because it does not based on
computational complexity, and its unconditional security is ensured by the “battle tested”
theory of quantum mechanics [1–5].
Since the first protocol of quantum cryptography was put forward by Bennett and Bras-
sard in 1984 [1], (hereafter called BB84 protocol,) quantum cryptography has been widely
investigated and developed by large numbers of researchers and scientists, not only in theory,
but also by experimental implementations. Unfortunately, there always exists some discrep-
ancies between the “in principle” unconditional security and realistic systems. Therefore,
people have to take practical usability into account when estimating a quantum cryptosys-
tem, just as summarized in Ref. [6]:
Infinite security⇒ Infinite cost
⇒ Zero practical interest. (1)
In current practice, an attenuated laser (i.e., emitting a weak coherent state WCS) or a
parametric down-conversion source (PDCS) are employed in most quantum cryptosystems.
A WCS is quite easy to implement. However, it contains a large vacuum state probability
amplitude and unneglectable multiphoton probability amplitude when attenuated to a single
photon level, which is fatal to photon-number-splitting (PNS) attack [7–10] and some other
attacks. To compensate the security, one has to attenuate a laser into a quite low inten-
sity (e.g. 0.1 photon/ pulse), resulting in a low secure key generation rate and a limited
transmission distance.
Fortunately, the so-called decoy-state method was given out [11–13]. The main idea of
the decoy-state method is to randomly mix extra decoy transmission events with the true
signal transmission events. The decoy transmission events and the signal transmission events
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have the same characteristics (such as wavelength, bandwidth and timing information, etc.)
except for different intensities. Therefore, for a given random photon state, Eve is unable to
judge whether it comes from a decoy transmission event or from a signal transmission event.
Hence she has to perform the same operations on them. On the other hand, the legitimate
users, Alice and Bob, could estimate the behavior of vacuum, single-photon and multi-photon
states individually just by doing some counting measurements and classical communications.
As a result, Eve’s eavesdropping with be detected. It has been shown that the decoy-
state method has significantly improved the performance of a quantum cryptography with
practical systems.
The heralded single-photon source (HSPS) from parametric down-converted (PDC) pro-
cesses has also been widely investigated in recent years [14–18]. Its sub-Poissonian photon
number distribution makes it suitable for the implementation of quantum cryptography. (It
has already been proven that a sub-Poissonian distributed source is superior to a Poissonian
one in the quantum cryptography [19].)
Combining the advantages of the decoy state method and the HSPS, we have proposed
some schemes that applies both of them in a quantum cryptography setup [20–23]. In
Ref. [20–22], only theoretical aspects are discussed (for simplicity, those models in them all
assumed some ideal conditions, i.e. the idler and the signal photons in different paths have
the same photon distributions before being detected. However, they can be quite different
in practice because of existing coupling loss and some other factors.). In Ref. [23], some
preliminary experimental results are presented. Here in this paper, we will describe our
theory and experiment in detail and include some experimental improvements as well.
This paper is organized as follows: At first, in section II, we will introduce some basic
theory on HSPS and report some experimental results from our group; In section III, we
will introduce our scheme in detail, and also do some numerical simulations to show the
advantages of our scheme compared with other practical schemes; In section IV, we will
describe our experimental setup and experimental processes, and compare our experimental
results with theoretical predictions; Subsequently, we will discuss some deficiencies existing
in our present systems, and then make suggestions on how to improve them in section V;
Finally, the conclusions are drawn and the future prospects are spelled out.
3
II. THEORY AND EXPERIMENT IN HSPS
In recent years, a HSPS based on a PDC process has been investigated by many groups.
With improvements of down conversion in waveguides and four-wave mixing, a lot of en-
couraging results have been reported [14–18].
The main idea of the HSPS is to use one photon (heralding) of a photon pair to announce
the arrival of the other one (heralded). The temporal statistics of a HSPS can be controlled
by utilizing a prior information (i.e., original distribution) extracted from the photon pairs.
As said in Ref. [14], during the nondegenarate spontaneous parametric down conversion
(SPDC) process, if a pulsed pump laser is used, as long as the coherence time of the emission,
∆tc, is much longer than the duration of the pump pulse, ∆t, i.e., ∆tc ≫ ∆t, (in practice
easily obtained by using ultrafast (fs) pulse pump lasers), a single emission process will
take place, giving an thermal photon number distribution. In contrast, when a continuous
wave (CW) laser is used, as long as ∆tc is much shorter than the gating period of the
detector, a large number of independent SPDC processes will be present, each thermally
distributed, but collectively resulting in a Poisson distribution. However, the “original”
distribution can be altered by conditional gating. By choosing proper gating time and using
an appropriate correlation rate, a sub-Poissonian distributed HSPS can be obtained as the
result of postselections.
To quantify our source, let us introduce the second-order auto-correlation function at
zero-time delay:
g(2)(0) =
2Pm≥2
P 2m≥1
. (2)
(It is known that, the value of g(2)(0) could be used to classify a source between a Poisson
(g(2)(0) = 1), a sub-Poisson (g(2)(0) < 1) and a super-Poisson (g(2)(0) > 1) distribution.)
Pm≥k is the probability to find at least k photons within a gating period, which can be
expressed as:
Pm≥k = P
corP accm≥k−1 + (1− P cor)P accm≥k, (3)
where P cor is the correlation rate of photon pairs, i.e. the probability that we can predict the
existence of a heralded photon when a heralding one was detected. (Its value equals unity
under perfect experimental conditions, i.e., when there is no coupling loss, no transmission
loss, and no detection loss etc.) P accm≥k is the probability that at least k accidental photons
are present within a gating period, which comes from the “original” statistical distribution
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of the down-converted light (the coherence time of the single photons (∆tc ∼ 10 ps) is much
less than the integration time (2.5 ns), as a result, those signal photons which are not coming
from the same SPDC process as the heralding one (it means they are not truly correlated
photon pairs) may also contribute to the final coincidence counts.). It is given by:
P accm≥k = 1−
k−1∑
i=0
µi
i!
e−µ, (k ≥ 2) (4)
where µ is the average photon number per gating time (before detection), µ = Rs · ∆tgate,
Rs is the mean photon number per second (before detection), and ∆tgate is the gating time
of the detector.
Moreover, the probability of getting exactly n photons within the gating time is:
P (n) = Pm≥n − Pm≥n+1, (n ≥ 2). (5)
To be noted, the vacuum state probability should be treated independently, which can
be stated as:
P (0) = P cor · di + (1− P cor) · e−µ, (6)
where di is the dark count probability of the detector for heralding photons.
Consequently, the single-photon probability is:
P (1) = 1− P (0)− Pm≥2. (7)
Considering Eqs. (2)-(7), in order to analyze a HSPS, we should at first get to know the
values of P cor and µ. In the following, we will explain how their values can be determined
in an experiment.
Our experimental setup for the HSPS is shown in Fig. 1. We use a CW laser at the
wavelength of 532 nm to pump a periodically-poled LiNbO3 (PPLN) crystal of 50 mm
length to generate non-degenerate correlated photon pairs. The photon at the wavelength
of 809 nm is called idler, and the one at the wavelength of 1555 nm is called signal. After
separation by a dichroic mirror (DM), they are coupled into different detectors. For the idler
photons, we used a Si-based APD (PerkinElmer SPCM-AQR-14) with a detection efficiency
of about 50%; for the signal photons, a InGaAs-APD (id200-SMF) operating in gated Geiger
mode is used. Whenever there is an idler photon being detected, an electronical pulse is sent
out. After the time chopper (TC, the details about it will be described in section IV), each
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Fig. 1: (Color online) Schematics of the experimental setup to produce a HSPS. PPLN:
periodically-poled LiNbO3 crystal; DM: dichroic mirror; F: filter; L: lens; TC: time chopper; CP:
counter processing; Ri and Rs are the photon rates inside the fibers for idler and signal
respectively; ri is the single photon counting rate at the Si-detector; R0 is the triggering rate; rc
and rs are the counting rates at the InGaAs detector triggered by idler photons and triggered by
random pulses individually.
electronical pulse is used to trigger the InGaAs detector (with a gating time of 2.5 ns), then
the coincidence count, rc, will be obtained; ri is the Si-detector single counting rate; rs is
the InGaAs detector single counting rate with random gating (the gating frequency is R0),
to provide the mean accidental photon number; R0 is the heralding rate, whose value can
be different from ri, because of the dead/delay time of the pulse generator used; Besides,
ηi (ηs) and di (ds) are the detection efficiency and dark count probability of idler (signal)
photons respectively; Ri (Rs) is the corresponding photon number for idler (signal) before
detection.
When the InGaAs detector is randomly gated, the detection probability can be written
as:
PRandet ≡
rs
R0
= 1− (1− P acc)(1− Pdark), (8)
where P acc (= 1− e−ηsRs∆tgate) and Pdark (= dsR0 ) are the corresponding probabilities caused
by accidental photons and dark counts.
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Table I. The measured photon-number distributions of our HSPS under different triggering
frequencies.
Trigger frequency 
(after time 
chopper, kHz) 
Mean photon 
number (per 
gate, 2.5ns) 
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200 0.577×10³ 0.566884 0.432830 2.85710×10 3.046×10³ 0.432837 
650 5.325×10³ 0.591017 0.406811 2.17189×10³ 2.597×10² 0.405844 
 
From these relations, it can be deduced that:
Rs =
1
ηs∆tgate
ln
R0 − ds
R0 − rs
. (9)
When the InGaAs detector is gated by idler photons, the detection probability is:
Pdet ≡
rc
R0
= 1− (1− P cor)(1− P acc)(1− Pdark), (10)
because the detection events can be caused by correlated photons, accidental photons or
dark counts. The equations above lead to:
P cor = 1− R0 − rc
R0 − ds
eηsRs∆tgate . (11)
Obviously, all the parameters in Eqs. (9) and (11) can be experimentally measured,
giving the values of Rs and P
cor. By substituting them into Eqs. (2)-(7), we can finally
calculate the photon number distribution of our source shown in Table I.
It can be seen from Table I that, because of a CW laser being used, the multi-photon
probability of our source has substantially been depressed. By carefully optimizing the
alignment of our optical systems, we can get a sub-Poissonain distributed HSPS with the
single photon probability of about 40% (it’s about 30% in [23]), which substantially improves
the performance of a quantum cryptography as shown in Fig. 2.
III. QUANTUM CRYPTOGRAPHY WITH A HSPS BASED DECOY-STATE
METHOD
Similarly to Ref. [20–22], we have used a three-intensity (µ′, µ, µ0) decoy-state method,
where µ′, µ and µ0 are the mean photon number per gate for the signal light, the decoy light
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and the “vacuum” light individually. The counting probabilities for µ′ and µ can be written
as:
Qµ′ =
∞∑
i=0
YnPµ′(n), (12)
Qµ =
∞∑
i=0
YnPµ(n), (13)
Defining Yn to be the yield of an n-photon state, i.e., the conditional probability of a
detection event at Bob’s side given that Alice sends out an n-photon state, which is essentially
a sum of two contributions, background and true signal, i.e., Yn = Y0 + 1 − (1 − η)n. η is
the combined detection efficiency and transmittance between Alice and Bob. Y0 is Bob’s
background rate, which includes the detector dark count and other background contributions
such as the stray light from timing pulses. The gain, Gn is the product of the probability
of Alice sending out an n-photon state and the conditional probability of Alice’s n-photon
state, which is given by: Gn = YnP (n). Pµ′(n) (Pµ(n)) is the n-photon number probability
in the source of µ′ (µ).
Furthermore, the average quantum bit error ratios (QBER) for µ′ and µ are given by:
Eµ′ =
∞∑
i=0
YnPµ′(n)en
Qµ′
, (14)
Eµ =
∞∑
i=0
YnPµ(n)en
Qµ
, (15)
where en is the quantum bit error probability of an n-photon state.
Eq. (12) and (13) lead to:
Pµ′(2)Qµ − Pµ(2)Qµ′
= Y0[Pµ′(2)Pµ(0)− Pµ(2)Pµ′(0)] + Y1[Pµ′(2)Pµ(1)− Pµ(2)Pµ′(1)]
+
∞∑
i=2
Yn[Pµ′(2)Pµ(n)− Pµ(2)Pµ′(n)]. (16)
Considering Eqs. (2)-(7) and the values of P cor for µ and µ′ in Table I, one can show that
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for our setup
∞∑
i=2
Yn(Pµ′(2)Pµ(n)− Pµ(2)Pµ′(n)) ≤ 0, which leads to:
Y1 ≥
Pµ′(2)Qµ − Pµ(2)Qµ′ − Y0(Pµ′(2)Pµ(0)− Pµ(2)Pµ′(0))
(Pµ′(2)Pµ(1)− Pµ(2)Pµ′(1))
,
e1 ≤
Eµ′Qµ′ − e0Y0Pµ′(0)
Y1p
′
1(µ
′)
.
When taking statistical fluctuations into account, we can get a lower bound for Y1 and an
upper bound for e1:
Y L1 =
Pµ′(2)Q
L
µ − Pµ(2)QUµ′ − Y U0 (Pµ′(2)Pµ(0)− Pµ(2)Pµ′(0))
(Pµ′(2)Pµ(1)− Pµ(2)Pµ′(1))
, (17)
eU1 =
Eµ′Q
U
µ′ − e0Y L0 Pµ′(0)
Y L1 p
′
1(µ
′)
, (18)
where QLµ ≡ Qµ
(
1− 10√
NµQµ
)
, QUµ′ ≡ Qµ′
(
1 + 10√
Nµ′Qµ′
)
, Qµ′E
U
µ′ ≡
Qµ′Eµ′
(
1 + 10√
Nµ′Qµ′Eµ′
)
, Y L0 ≡
(
1− 10√
N0Y0
)
, and Y U0 ≡
(
1 + 10√
N0Y0
)
[24].
After error correction and privacy amplification, we can get the final key generation rate
from the signal (µ′) [25, 26]:
R ≥ q
{
−Qµ′f (Eµ′)H2 (Eµ′) +G0 +GL1
[
1−H2
(
eU1
)]}
, (19)
where the factor q (= 1
2
) comes from the cost of basis mismatch in the Bennett-Brassard 1984
(BB84) protocol, (it’s 1
4
when a one-detector scheme is used), f(Eµ′) is a factor represents
the cost of error correction given existing error correction systems in practice. We use
f(Eµ′) = 1.22 here [8]; In addition, G0 ≡ Y0Pµ′(0); GL1 ≡ Y L1 Pµ′(1); H2 (x) is the binary
Shannon information function, given by
H2 (x) = −x log2(x)− (1− x) log2(1− x).
We have used decoy states in the above deduction processes for GL1 and e
U
1 . However, we
will consider the case without decoy states in the following, in order to make a comparison.
Without decoy state, we have to do a pessimistic assumption in the estimation of GL1 and
eU1 , i.e., we have to assume that the photons that fail to arrive at Bob’s side all come from
single photon states. As a result, we get the lower bound of G1 as:
GL1 = Qµ′ −G0 −
∞∑
i=2
Pµ′(n). (20)
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It’s the same as Eq. (18), corresponding upper bound value of e1 can also be obtained.
Using the formulas above and considering different distributions, we can give a comparison
between our scheme using a HSPS based decoy-state method and other practical schemes,
including using a HSPS but without decoy-state method, WCS with (or without) decoy-state
method, and an ideal single photon source. For the sake of fairness, during the comparison
in all the schemes, we use the BB84 protocol and assume the same experimental conditions,
i.e., the same dark count probability 0.8×10−5/gate, the same detection efficiency 7.5%, and
the same misalignment of the system edet ector ∼ 2.5%. Corresponding numerical simulation
results are shown in Fig. 2. Clearly, compared with other practical schemes, our scheme
can tolerate the highest total loss, that also means the highest key generation rate under
fixed loss. Moreover, if a HSPS with 70 percent single photon probability (reported in [27])
is used, its performance can come close to the ideal single photon case.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL IMPLEMENTATION
Our experimental setup is shown in Fig. 3. Using the same structures as in Fig. 1, we can
get a HSPS with narrow bandwidth (0.8 nm FWHM) and a single photon number probability
of about 40% (see Table I). (The single photon probability is improved compared with before
reported in [23]. Because here we use a new pump laser whose coherence length and spectrum
has a little difference from the former one, which will inevitably influence the following
focusing and collecting processes. On the other hand, the single photon probability obtained
has close correlations with the final coincidence counting rate, and the final coincidence
counting rate is so sensitive to the optical alignment and optical focusing settings. So
we try to readjust the positions of focusing lenses and re-optimize the optical alignment,
which result in an increased coincidence counting rate, and also an improved single photon
probability.) Then the heralded single photons are transmitted from Alice to Bob through
25 km of spooled SMF-28 fiber (attenuation: 0.2 dB/km), incorporating a one-way Faraday-
Michelson (F-M) cryptosystem [28]. We use a four-state [29] and one-detector phase-coding
scheme, which is immune to time-shift attacks [30, 31], faked-state attacks [32], Trojan horse
attacks [33], and can also been proven to be secure against any other standard individual or
coherent attacks.
In order to generate down-converted light with three intensities (µ′, µ, µ0), on one hand
10
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Fig. 2: (Color online) The key generation ratio vs. the total losses comparing several different
schemes. The numerical simulations are done in the case of: a) With WCS and without
decoy-state method. b) With HSPS and without decoy-state method; c). With WCS based
decoy-state method (with optimal values of µ′ at each point and an infinite number of decoy
states). d) With HSPS based decoy-state method with Pcor=40% (µ
′ = 5.325 × 10−3 and
µ = 6.600 × 10−4, these parameters come from our experiment. After numerical simulation, we
also find the key ratio is stable with moderate variations of the value of µ′ or µ). e) With HSPS
based decoy-state method with Pcor=70% (µ
′ = 5.325 × 10−3 and µ = 6.600 × 10−4). f) With the
ideal SPS. (Noted: For fair comparison, we consider using infinite number of signal pulses, so we
don’t take statistical fluctuation into account in all these lines above.)
we place an acousto-optic-modulator (AOM, 3.5 dB loss) in front of the PPLN crystal, on
the other hand, we use a fiber pig-tailed optical switch (OS, 0.6 dB loss) at the arm of signal
photons (1555 nm). By controlling both of them in our program (changing between µ′ and µ
with AOM, and changing between µ and µ0 with OS), we can randomly generate signals with
three different mean photon numbers: [µ′, µ, µ0] = [5.325×10−3, 0.660×10−3, 0.577×10−5].
(Because of an imperfect isolation ratio of the optical switch (∼ 20 dB), we don’t produce
a real vacuum state, but generate a low mean photon number for µ0. We use its counting
rate instead of Y0 for the estimation of Y1, resulting in a lower estimated value of Y1. This
also gives a lower key generation rate.) The ratio of heralding pulses (i.e., gating instances)
between the three intensities is about 10 : 4 : 1. In order to minimize the impact that the
11
Fig. 3: (Color online) The experimental setup of our quantum key transmission system. PPLN:
periodically-poled LiNbO3; AOM: acousto-optical-modulator; WDM: wavelength-division
multiplexing; OS: optical switch; TC: time chopper; BS: beam-splitter; FM: Faraday Mirror; PM:
phase modulator; DL: delay line; QC: quantum channel; SPD: single photon detector; CB:
control board.
power change would have on the triggering rate (since when we change the pump intensity,
we change the intensities of both 809 nm and 1555 nm photons), we inserted a fixed dead
time after each electrical pulse generated from the Si-APD, calling it time chopper (TC).
This way, when the power is increased, the triggering rate does not increase in the same
ratio, and according to experimental verification, the dark count probability of our InGaAs
APD does not change significantly with the dead time implemented. This dead time was
implemented in the software controlling the whole QKD session, and it was also important
for our electronic circuit to be able to keep the transmission synchronized. In addition, in
order to get a higher visibility in the F-M interferometers (> 95%, without removing any
dark counts), we use a wavelength-division multiplexing (WDM) filter to further narrow the
bandwidth of the signal photons to 0.4 nm at FWHM. (The spectra measured before the
WDM and after the WDM of 1555 nm photons are shown in Fig. 5(a). Fig. 5(b) shows the
12
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Fig. 4: (Color online) Comparing the theoretical values and experimental results in coincidence
counting rate and the final secure key rate. The top line represents the theoretical counting rate
for signal photons (µ′); the bottom line represents the theoretical secure key rate (taking
statistical fluctuation into account). For each line, we investigated two points at the total loss of
31dB and 36dB individually. The stars and triangles are corresponding experimental results.
interference curve of our F-M interferometer measured with a ”strong” light after the WDM
filter.)
In our quantum cryptosystem, in order to compensate for the phase-drift in the inter-
ferometers caused by the environment, we adopted a scan and transmission mode. The
electronic circuit first generates an interference curve, to obtain the correct working volt-
ages for the phase modulators, and then quantum transmission occurs. After a few blocks
of data are exchanged, transmission is stopped and scanning recommence to verify if the
working point has changed for the next transmission burst, then this pattern follows. For
details we refer to [28]. The scan and transmission mode used makes the system quite stable
for several hours of continuous measurements. For example, during a typical measurement
of 12000 s, (with effective transmission time about 4200 s, the scan and responding time
are considerably longer than the transmission time because of the low coincidence count
rate), with a total of 1.5 ×109 triggering pulses, the detection efficiency is about 7.5%, the
”vacuum state” counting rate is about 0.8 × 10−5/gate, (we attribute 0.7 × 10−5 coming
from dark counts, and 0.1 × 10−5 coming from the leakage of the optical switch and the
misalignment of the system,) the counting rate, Qµ′ (Qµ) and average QBER, Eµ′ (Eµ) are
13
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Fig. 5(a): (Color online) Spectra of the signal photons (1555nm) with a strong pump. a1)
Measured before the WDM filter; a2) Measured after the WDM filter.
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Fig. 5(b): (Color online) The interference curve measured with a ”strong” light after the WDM
filter passing through our F-M interferometer. (Without removing any dark counts.)
about 1.01× 10−4 (1.06× 10−4) and 6.33% (5.44%) respectively. After a total loss of 36 dB,
we get a key generation rate of about 5.065× 10−6. Finally, we obtain 5065 secure key bits
from a total of 143176 coincidence counts, which agrees well with the theoretical value as
shown in Fig. 4 (using a similar simulation model as [20, 22] in our theoretical predictions).
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND PROSPECTS
Our final key rate is lower than those in other systems reported [34–38], because there
are substantial losses in our present system. Apart from the insertion loss of the WDM
filter, the optical switch and a very low detection efficiency of our detector, the main loss
comes from the F-M interferometer used, because the signal photons have to go through
each phase modulator (PM) twice, and have to suffer losses from two beam-splitters (BS).
The aforementioned reasons caused a total loss of about 31 dB. However, using present
technology, it’s realistic to decrease the loss to a lower value. For example, in order to
remove the loss coming from the WDM filter, a narrow bandwidth filter at the wavelength
at 809 nm can used at heralding photons instead. This will not only avoid the loss of signal
photons, but also increase the correlation rate of photon pairs (it’s 70% reported in [27]).
Or if a cavity structure is used during the parametric down-conversion processes, it will
intrinsically depress the bandwidth of the down-converted light. Moreover, to overcome the
loss coming from the F-M interferometer, a low loss Mach-Zehnder (M-Z) interferometer
([38, 39]) can be used instead. Alternatively, if a polarization-coding scheme is used to
replace present phase-coding scheme, no interferometer needed, so the scheme will suffer
even less loss. In addition, we can also use a better detector at 1555 nm (with a lower dark
count probability (∼ 10−6) or a higher detection efficiency (10−15%)) or use a two-detector
scheme. In all, it’s quite realistic to reduce loss by 15 − 18 dB with present technology,
corresponding to an increased transmission distance of more than 100 km.
In summary, though our present setup still contains many deficiencies, our experimental
results are sufficient to in principle demonstrate that our using the HSPS based decoy state
scheme could overcome many practical schemes in loss tolerance, which also means it could
give a highest key generation rate under fixed loss. Besides, our scheme does not evoke
higher costs or other technological requirements than in any other schemes. Therefore, even
when practical usability is taken into account, it is still a very promising candidate in the
implementation of the quantum cryptography in the near future. (The first three authors-Q.
Wang, W. Chen and G. Xavier contribute equally to the work.)
Acknowledgement
Qin Wang is grateful to Prof. X. B. Wang (Tsinghua Univ.) and Dr. C. H. F. Fung
(Univ. of Toronto) for fruitful discussions, and Prof. G. Bjo¨rk for valuable comments.
15
This work was funded by the EU through the QAP (Qubit Applications-015848) project,
and the SECOQC project (FP6-2002-IST-1-506813), the Swedish Science Research Council,
the Swedish Foundation for Strategic Research, the ECOC Foundation; and partly funded
by the National Science Foundation of China under Grant No. 60537020 and 60621064,
Chinese Academy of Sciences and International Partnership Project. G. B. Xavier thanks
the Brazilian agencies CAPES and CNPq for financial support.
[1] C. H. Bennett and G. Brassard, in Proceedings of IEEE International Conference on Com-
puters, Systems, and Signal Processing, Bangalore, India (IEEE, New York, 1984), p. 175.
[2] A. K. Ekert, Phys. Rev. Lett. 67, 661 (1991).
[3] P. W. Shor and J. Preskill, Phys. Rev. Lett. 85, 441 (2000).
[4] D. Mayers, J. ACM 48, 351 (2001).
[5] H.-K. Lo and H.-F. Chau, Science 283, 2050 (1999).
[6] N. Gisin, G. Ribordy, W. Tittel, and H. Zbinden, Rev. Mod. Phys. 74, 145 (2002).
[7] B. Huttner, N. Imoto, N. Gisin, and T. Mor, Phys. Rev. A 51, 1863 (1995); H. P. Yuen,
Quantum Semiclassic. Opt. 8, 939 (1996).
[8] G. Brassard, N. Lu¨tkenhaus, T. Mor, and B. Sanders, Phys. Rev. Lett. 85, 1330 (2000).
[9] N. Lu¨tkenhaus and M. Jahma, New J. Phys. 4, 44 (2002).
[10] N. Lu¨tkenhaus, Phys. Rev. A, 61, 052304 (2000).
[11] W. Y. Hwang, Phys. Rev. Lett. 91, 057901 (2003).
[12] X. B. Wang, Phys. Rev. Lett. 94, 230503 (2005).
[13] H. K. Lo, X. Ma, and K. Chen, Phys. Rev. Lett. 94, 230504 (2005).
[14] M. Tengner, and D. Ljunggren, e-print quant-ph/0706.2985v1.
[15] H. D. Riedmatten et al., J. Mod. Opt. 51, 1637 2004.
[16] S. Mori, J. So¨derholm, N. Namekata and S. Inoue, Opt. Commun. 264, 156 (2006).
[17] O. Alibart, D. B. Ostrowsky, P. Baldi, and S. Tanzilli, Opt. Lett. 30, 1539 (2005).
[18] A. Trifonov and A. Zavriyev, J. Opt. B: Quantum Semiclass. Opt. 7, S772 (2005).
[19] E. Waks, C. Santori, and Y. Yamamoto, Phys. Rev. A 66, 042315 (2002).
[20] Q. Wang, X. B. Wang, and G. C. Guo, Phys. Rev. A 75, 012312 (2007).
[21] Q. Wang, and A. Karlsson, Phys. Rev. A 76, 014309 (2007).
16
[22] Q. Wang, X. B. Wang, G. Bjo¨rk and A. Karlsson, Europhys. Lett. 79, 40001 (2007).
[23] Q. Wang et al., Phys. Rev. Lett., 100, 090501 (2008).
[24] We estimated e1 and Y1 very conservatively as within 10 standard deviations, which promises
a confidence interval for statistical fluctuations of less than 1× 10−23.
[25] D. Gottesman, H.-K. Lo, N. Lu¨tkenhaus, and J. Preskill, Quantum Inf. Comput. 4, 325 (2004).
[26] M. Koashi, e-print quant-ph/0609180v1.
[27] A. Zavriyev and A. Trifonov, in Proceedings of single photon workshop 2007 (Turin, Italy,
2007).
[28] X. F. Mo, B. Zhu, Z. F. Han, Y. Z. Gui, and G. C. Guo, Opt. Lett. 30, 2632 (2005); Z. F.
Han, X. F. Mo, Y. Z. Gui and G. C. Guo, Appl. Phys. Lett. 86, 221103 (2005).
[29] M. J. LaGasse, Secure use of a single single-photon detector in a QKD system, United States
patent application 20050190922 (2005).
[30] B. Qi, C. H. F. Fung, H. K. Lo, and X. F. Ma, Quantum Inf. Com. 7, 073 (2007)
[31] Y. Zhao, C. H. F. Fung, B. Qi, C. Chen, H. K. Lo, e-print quant-ph/0704.3253.
[32] V. Makarov, J. Skaar, e-print quant-ph/0702262.
[33] N. Gisin, S. Fasel, B. Kraus, H. Zbinden, and G. Ribordy, Phys. Rev. A 73, 022320 (2006).
[34] Y. Zhao, B. Qi, X. F. Ma, H. K. Lo, and L. Qian, Phys. Rev. Lett. 96, 070502 (2006).
[35] D. Rosenberg et al, Phys. Rev. Lett., 98, 010503 (2007).
[36] T. Schmitt-Manderbach et al., Phys. Rev. Lett., 98, 010504 (2007).
[37] C. Z. Peng et al., Phys. Rev. Lett., 98, 010505 (2007).
[38] Z. L. Yuan, A. W. Sharpe, and A. J. Shields, Appl. Phys. Lett. 90, 011118 (2007).
[39] P. M. Intallura, M. B. Ward, O. Z. Karimov, Z. L. Yuan, P. See, and A. J. Shields, e-print
quant-ph/0710.0565.
17
